Abstract: How to promote the sharing of personal data while protecting individuals’ rights and interests is an important issue facing the governance of the digital business ecosystem. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving individuals, data firms, and the government. MATLAB-based numerical simulations are employed to analyze the impact of compliance requirements, enterprise costs, penalties for violations, and tort compensation on the strategies of each party. The study finds that there are six possible locally stable equilibria; both individual authorization and enterprise compliance sharing can be achieved under either high or low compliance requirements. Raising compliance requirements can strengthen the constraint on non-compliant sharing, but it also increases enterprises’ compliance costs, and therefore does not necessarily induce enterprises to choose compliance sharing. The expected losses from violations, enterprise compliance costs, and government implementation costs jointly influence the formation of the two types of compliance-sharing equilibria. The governance of personal data sharing, therefore, should coordinate compliance requirements, accountability for violations, and remedies for rights according to specific scenarios, and reduce the implementation costs of compliance sharing.

Key words: digital business ecosystem, personal data sharing, compliance requirements, regulatory strategy, evolutionary game