Abstract: In recent years, the theoretical form of Mencius’ ethical thought and its relationship with consequentialism have attracted extensive attention from academic circles. Three core issues concerned urgently call for deliberation: first, whether the “benevolence and righteousness” advocated by Mencius bears intrinsic value independent of “benefit”; second, whether Mencius opposed the moral reasoning model of consequentialism; third, the role played by “benevolence and righteousness” in moral actions within Mencius’ context. Some scholars hold that Mencius not only firmly believes that “benevolence and righteousness”, as human nature and the sole motive of moral conduct, has intrinsic value independent of “benefit”, but also opposes the “two-root” mode of thinking underlying consequentialism; some argue that the entire value of “benevolence and righteousness” lies in the maximal utility it can generate; the “two-root” argument and other textual evidence that seems capable of refuting this consequentialist interpretation can all be properly addressed within this interpretive framework. Although the two sides still have divergences in their understandings, the relevant discussion has deepened the understanding of the multi-layered nature and complexity of Mencius’ ethical thought, and provided new directions for the contemporary interpretation of Confucian philosophy.

Key words: Mencius, consequentialism, the debate between righteousness and benefit, benevolence and righteousness, Chinese-Western comparative studies, Confucian ethics