广西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2026, Vol. 62 ›› Issue (1): 168-188.doi: 10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2026.01.015

• 经济与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

创新型城市的演化逻辑:一个基于复杂适应系统的分析框架

夏天1, 张海丰2,3   

  1. 1.南京大学 商学院,江苏 南京 210023 ;
    2.广西师范大学 经济管理学院,广西 桂林 541004;
    3.广西师范大学 东盟区域与国别研究院,广西 桂林 541004
  • 收稿日期:2025-10-12 出版日期:2026-01-05 发布日期:2026-02-26
  • 作者简介:夏天,南京大学商学院博士研究生,研究方向:创新型城市;张海丰,广西师范大学经济管理学院院长、教授,研究方向:后发国家的技术赶超与技术创新。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金重大招标项目“新发展理念体系化学理化研究阐释”(24&ZD006)

The Evolutionary Logic of Innovative Cities: An Analytical Framework Based on Complex Adaptive Systems

XIA Tian1, ZHANG Hai-feng2,3   

  1. 1. School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541004, China;
    3. Institute of ASEAN Studies on Regions and Countries, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541004, China
  • Received:2025-10-12 Online:2026-01-05 Published:2026-02-26

摘要: 在经济地理的意义上,城市无疑是区域经济增长的重要引擎。现代城市存在类型多元的行为主体,这些异质性主体的交互使城市成为典型的复杂适应系统。选取政府、企业和高校(科研院所)这三个典型的创新主体构建三方演化博弈模型,并对三者进行博弈分析和仿真模拟,研究发现:初始意愿是协同创新的关键驱动力,政府、企业和高校的初始创新意愿对三方博弈的均衡结果具有显著影响;成本与收益的敏感性决定创新策略选择,政府、企业、高校和科研院所对于参与创新的成本和收益都较为敏感,同时三方博弈的溢出效应和挤压效应在城市演化过程发挥关键作用;政府与市场的动态协同机制至关重要,政府的适度干预可有效弥补市场失灵,但过度干预可能抑制创新型城市的培育,政府声誉在创新型城市演化过程中同样扮演重要角色;企业和高校之间合理的收益配置是创新型城市演进的长效保障,高校与科研院所的参与不仅依赖政府的补贴,更需通过跨学科协作、产学研深度融合提升自身创新效率。为加强创新型城市建设,我国应构建多维政策支持体系,激发创新主体内生动力;优化成本收益结构,建立可持续创新生态;构建政府与市场的动态协同机制,增强政策灵活性与适应性;优化企业与高校的收益分配机制,激发高校持续参与动力。

关键词: 创新型城市, 演化经济地理学, 演化博弈, 复杂适应系统, 仿真分析

Abstract: In the sense of economic geography, cities are undoubtedly important engines of regional economic growth. Modern cities host diverse types of actors, and the interactions among these heterogeneous entities make cities typical complex adaptive systems. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving three typical innovation actors—government, enterprises, and universities (research institutes)—and performs game analysis and simulation. The study finds that: 1) initial willingness is a key driver of collaborative innovation as the initial innovation willingness of the government, enterprises, and universities significantly influences the equilibrium outcome of the tripartite game. 2) sensitivity to costs and benefits determines innovation strategy choices as all three parties are highly sensitive to the costs and benefits of participating in innovation, while spillover and crowding-out effects play critical roles in the urban evolution process. 3) the dynamic coordination mechanism between the government and the market is crucial as appropriate government intervention can well address market failures, but over-intervention may inhibit the cultivation of innovative cities; government reputation also plays an important role in the evolution of innovative cities. 4) reasonable benefit distribution between enterprises and universities is a long-term guarantee for the evolution of innovative cities; the participation of universities and research institutes depends not only on government subsidies but also on enhancing their own innovation efficiency through interdisciplinary collaboration and deep industry-university-research integration. To strengthen the construction of innovative cities, China should build a multi-dimensional policy support system to stimulate the endogenous motivation of innovation actors, optimize the cost-benefit structure to establish a sustainable innovation ecosystem, construct a dynamic government-market coordination mechanism to enhance policy flexibility and adaptability, and improve the benefit distribution mechanism between enterprises and universities to motivate sustained participation from universities.

Key words: innovative cities, evolutionary economic geography, evolutionary game theory, complex adaptive systems, simulation analysis

中图分类号:  F293.1

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