Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) ›› 2022, Vol. 58 ›› Issue (6): 55-68.doi: 10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2022.06.005

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Complex Situations and Multiple Responses: Action Logic of Policy Executors at the Primary Level —Based on the Case of Implementation of Targeted Poverty Alleviation Policy in X Town, Sichuan Province

HUANG Juan1, TANG Yin-bin2   

  1. 1. School of Government, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China;
    2. School of Public Administration, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
  • Received:2022-02-18 Online:2022-11-15 Published:2023-02-15

Abstract: Whether policies can be well implemented relies on the performance of primary-level policy executors. Such performance, however, in reality often presents a complex and contradictory pattern. This paper takes the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies in X Town (Sichuan) as a case, and finds that there has been a triple logic in implementing policies: 1) when dealing with the conflict between policy objectives, implementation pressure and insufficient resources, these executors give normative response that will produce a compliant logic of policy target effect; 2) when dealing with the internal contradiction of policy design and its conflict with the working environment and target groups, they take the initiative to adjust the behavior and promote the adaptive logic of policy localization; 3) when there are institutional loopholes in the policy implementation system and profit opportunities provided by the working environment, they strive for self-protection and self-interest, leading to distorted logic of policy alienation. Through an in-depth analysis of this individual case, we hope to make up for the shortcomings of the current policy implementation design and thusprovide inspiration for China’s rural revitalization: rural revitalization cannot be measured by various indicators alone, nor can it be promoted by administrative forces alone; the system and specific measures for rural revitalization should be designed according to local conditions. In terms of the corresponding policy design, we must be aware of the inherent flexibility of primary-level policy executors and their positive role in resolving the unique organizational paradox in China; the key is to find the crux of the problem, and find the right path for development; policies should be implemented in line with local conditions for localization, instead of relying on various indicators, an approach resulting in bench-marking in response to pressure.

Key words: policy executors at the primary level, policy implementation, action logic, policies of targeted poverty alleviation

CLC Number: 

  • D630
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