广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版） ›› 2020, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (6): 86-102.doi: 10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2020.06.008

• 政治、法律与社会 • 上一篇    下一篇

环境冲突与地方政府的协商民主制度化:基于省际听证文件数的实证研究

吴进进1,2   

  1. 1.中国社会科学院财经战略研究院,北京 100732;
    2.深圳大学管理学院公共管理系,广东 深圳 518061
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-26 出版日期:2020-11-25 发布日期:2020-12-01
  • 作者简介:吴进进(1987-),男,安徽枞阳人,深圳大学管理学院助理教授,硕士生导师。
  • 基金资助:
    2019年度国家自然科学基金项目“我国地方财政结余对财政支出周期性影响及其机制研究”(71904130);中国博士后科学基金第62批面上资助项目“我国财政结转结余资金成因与机制分析”(2017M621004)

Environmental Conflicts and the Institutionalization of Consultative Democracy of Local Governments: An Empirical Study Based on the Number of Inter-Provincial Hearing Documents

WU Jin-jin   

  1. 1. National Academy of Economic Strategy,CASS,Beijing 100732;
    2. College of Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518061,China
  • Received:2020-05-26 Online:2020-11-25 Published:2020-12-01

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摘要： 随着环境污染问题的加剧,环境信访数量也迅速增长,中国社会进入环境冲突的高发期。以听证文件作为协商民主制度化的代理指标,发现环境来访对听证文件数有显著的积极作用,每百万人口增加10人次来访,听证文件就会增加约0.4件,但是环境信件数对听证文件数的影响不显著。相比大气污染信访,水污染信访对听证文件数的影响更为明显,每百万人口增加1件水污染信件会使地方政府多制定约0.1件听证文件,水污染来访的影响也远远大于大气污染来访。信访机制有利于政府决策部门及时掌握社会冲突信息,进行社会风险预警,有效地推动政府完善协商民主制度以应对社会冲突。

关键词: 环境冲突, 环境污染, 环境信访, 地方政府, 协商民主制度化, 听证文件

Abstract: With the aggravation of environmental pollution,the number of environmental petition letters has been also growing rapidly,a situation that pushed China to enter a period of high incidence of environmental conflicts.This paper,taking the hearing documents as the proxy index of consultative democracy institutionalization,finds 1) environmental petition visit bears a significant positive effect on the number of hearing documents,a fact told by a growth of 0.4 cases for an increase of 10 petition visits per million people;2) the number of petition letters bears no significant impact on that of hearing documents.The findings add 1) compared with the air pollution petition,the impact of water pollution petition on the number of hearing documents is more obvious,a truth verified by local governments'drawing up 0.1 more document for one more letter per million people;2) the impact of water pollution visits is far greater than that of air pollution visits.This study shows that petition mechanism is conducive for the decision-making departments to timely grasp the social conflict information so as to carry out early warning,thus improving the consultative democracy system for better dealing with social conflicts.

Key words: environmental Conflict, environmental pollution, environmental petition, local government, institutionalization of consultation democracy, hearing documents

中图分类号: 

  • D035.5
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