产能过剩、地方政府干预与商业银行不良贷款——基于省际面板数据的实证

doi:10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2020.06.012

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于我国供给侧改革过程中的“产能过剩”背景,纳入地方政府干预的影响,探讨2009年以来新一轮不良贷款的成因,分析产能过剩与不良贷款之间的传导机制,并采用2009—2016年的省际面板数据,建立动态面板模型并采用差分的广义矩估计,实证检验造成我国新一轮不良贷款的因素,检验产能过剩与不良贷款之间的关系,结果表明:产能过剩与商业银行不良贷款率呈正向变动,地方政府干预仍然是2009年后新一轮不良贷款的重要原因; 我国产能过剩呈现大范围、多行业的特征,系统性金融风险集聚。为避免风险,消除隐患,必须健全市场退出渠道,增强商业银行信贷审批决策环节的独立性,构建多元化的地方官员政绩考核指标体系。

关键词: 不良贷款, 商业银行, 产能过剩, 地方政府干预, 金融风险

Abstract: Based on the background of “overcapacity” in China's supply side reform,taking into account the influence of local government intervention,this paper 1) explores the causes of a new round of non-performing loans since 2009;2) analyzes the transmission mechanism between overcapacity and non-performing loans;3) employs the provincial panel data (2009-2016) to establish a dynamic panel model and take the generalized moment estimation of difference for empirically testing the new round of non-performing loans in China,and the relationship between overcapacity and non-performing loans.The findings tell 1) overcapacity and the non-performing loan ratio of commercial banks bear positive changes,and local intervention has been an important reason behind the new round of non-performing loans since 2009;2) China's overcapacity is featured with large-scale,multi-industry,and systemic financial risk concentration.In order to avoid risks and eliminate hidden dangers,it is necessary to improve the market exit channels,enhance the independence of credit approval decision-making links of commercial banks,and build a diversified performance evaluation index system for local officials,the paper points out in conclusion.

Key words: non-performing loans, commercial banks, overcapacity, local government intervention, financial risk

中图分类号:

F424

周天芸. 产能过剩、地方政府干预与商业银行不良贷款——基于省际面板数据的实证[J]. 广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）, 2020, 56(6): 146-162.

ZHOU Tian-yun. Overcapacity, Local Government Intervention and Non-performing Loans of Commercial Banks——An Empirical Study Based on Provincial Panel Data[J]. Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2020, 56(6): 146-162.

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