Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) ›› 2020, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (6): 45-58.doi: 10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2020.06.005

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The Causes and Resolution of “Fragmentation of Emergency Governance”——An Comparative Analysis Based on Conventional and Emergency Governance Mechanisms

CHEN Ke-lin   

  1. Institute of Urban Governance Studies,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,China
  • Received:2020-08-26 Online:2020-11-25 Published:2020-12-01

Abstract: Fragmentation of emergency governance refers to the governance state in which the integrated collaborative emergency governance fails due to the division of functions and business among local governments.Its root lies in the contradiction between the limited attention and the complexity of administrative affairs faced by local officials under the logic of national governance in China.Under the conventional governance mechanism,territorial management,accountability to superiors and differential political responsibility,render local officials to focus their limited attention on the performance appraisal indicators stipulated by their superiors,while the three principles also bring about rigidity of bureaucratic system operation,in contrast with what the mobilization of emergency management naturally requires:reconstruction of organization,power and responsibility.Such a gap results in the subject to the internal contradictions of organizational logic and makes the emergency governance fragmented in local officials'employing the conventional mechanism to carry out emergency management.The channel lies in the strong intervention and emergency mobilization by the central government,i.e.through the approach of “pooling resources to solve major problems”.The fragmentation of emergency governance reflects the profound contradiction between “unity” and “flexibility” under the centralized system.Therefore,the fundamental solution to this phenomenon rests on reconstructing the power structure of vertical intergovernmental relations,and give full play to the unique institutional advantages of China's national governance by the legalization of vertical intergovernmental relations.

Key words: China’s national governance, emergency governance fragmentation, governace mechanism, institutional logic, local officials

CLC Number: 

  • D035.5
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