Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) ›› 2020, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (6): 86-102.doi: 10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2020.06.008

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Environmental Conflicts and the Institutionalization of Consultative Democracy of Local Governments: An Empirical Study Based on the Number of Inter-Provincial Hearing Documents

WU Jin-jin   

  1. 1. National Academy of Economic Strategy,CASS,Beijing 100732;
    2. College of Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518061,China
  • Received:2020-05-26 Online:2020-11-25 Published:2020-12-01

Abstract: With the aggravation of environmental pollution,the number of environmental petition letters has been also growing rapidly,a situation that pushed China to enter a period of high incidence of environmental conflicts.This paper,taking the hearing documents as the proxy index of consultative democracy institutionalization,finds 1) environmental petition visit bears a significant positive effect on the number of hearing documents,a fact told by a growth of 0.4 cases for an increase of 10 petition visits per million people;2) the number of petition letters bears no significant impact on that of hearing documents.The findings add 1) compared with the air pollution petition,the impact of water pollution petition on the number of hearing documents is more obvious,a truth verified by local governments'drawing up 0.1 more document for one more letter per million people;2) the impact of water pollution visits is far greater than that of air pollution visits.This study shows that petition mechanism is conducive for the decision-making departments to timely grasp the social conflict information so as to carry out early warning,thus improving the consultative democracy system for better dealing with social conflicts.

Key words: environmental Conflict, environmental pollution, environmental petition, local government, institutionalization of consultation democracy, hearing documents

CLC Number: 

  • D035.5
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