“数字避责”:重大突发公共事件中基层官员避责行为研究——基于多案例的综合分析

doi:10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2022.01.007

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在重大突发公共事件中,上级试图构建数字生产体制以实现透明、精准、精细化治理。数字生产体制为上级激发下级的积极性提供了动力,但数字生产体制的内在困境使得基层官员产生了表象策略、机构策略、政策策略和反向策略等避责行为,形成“低问责均衡”。“数字避责”是官僚体制的内生产物,是基层官员面对不确定性风险和问责高压的选择,也是官僚理性的体现。基层官员以制造数字景观、形式主义等行政程序来应对技术治理要求,重构了权力链,在一定程度上消解了问责主体的意图。在未来的国家治理中,应该重新定位行政规范化、技术化导向,缓解技术理性的过度膨胀,构建良性、健全的问责链,为基层官员创造敢于担当尽责的制度环境。

关键词: 数字避责, 数字生产, 技术治理, 基层官员, 重大突发公共事件

Abstract: The superiors, in addressing major public emergencies, try to build a digital production system to achieve transparent, precise and refined governance. Digital production system lends impetus for the superiors to stimulate the subordinates’ enthusiasm. However, its inherent dilemma leads to primary-level officials’ blame avoidance behaviors such as representational strategy, institutional strategy, policy strategy and reverse strategy, forming a “low accountability equilibrium”. “Blame avoidance by Data” is the endogenous product of bureaucratic system, the choice of these officials’ facing uncertain risks and high pressure of accountability, as well as the embodiment of bureaucratic rationality. These officials respond to the technical governance requirements by creating digital landscape, formalism and other administrative procedures, reconstruct the power chain, and dispel the intention of the accountable subjects to a certain extent. In the future national governance, we should relocate the administrative standardization and technical orientation, alleviate the excessive expansion of technical rationality so as to build a benign and sound accountability chain, thus creating an institutional environment for primary-level officials who dare to take responsibility.

Key words: blame avoidance by data, digital production, technical governance, primary-level officials, major public emergencies

中图分类号:

田先红. “数字避责”:重大突发公共事件中基层官员避责行为研究——基于多案例的综合分析[J]. 广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）, 2022, 58(1): 74-87.

TIAN Xian-hong. “Blame Avoidance by Data”: Research on the Behavior of Blame Avoidance of Primary-level Officials in Major Public Emergencies —Comprehensive Analysis Based on Multiple Cases[J]. Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2022, 58(1): 74-87.

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