复杂情境与多重应对: 基层政策执行者的行动逻辑——基于四川省X镇精准扶贫政策执行的个案

doi:10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2022.06.005

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基层政策执行者的行动是决定政策能否成功落实的关键,但现实中其政策执行行为经常呈现出复杂且矛盾的样态。以四川省X镇的精准扶贫政策执行为个案,研究发现基层政策执行者在复杂基层执行情境中有三重执行逻辑:一是应对政策目标、执行压力与资源不足的冲突时,规范性地逐一应对,产生政策目标化效果的合规式逻辑;二是应对政策设计内部矛盾及其与工作环境和目标群体特点冲突时,采取主动调整行为,促成政策本土化的变通式逻辑;三是应对政策执行体系存在制度漏洞与工作环境提供的谋利机会时,争取自我保护和自我利益,导致政策异化的扭曲式逻辑。深入剖析个案,能够弥补现有政策执行设计思路的不足,为实施乡村振兴战略提供启示:乡村振兴不能仅用各种指标来衡量,也不能单靠行政力量来推动,乡村振兴的制度和具体措施要根据各地的情况因地制宜地设计。在相应政策设计时必须意识到基层政策执行者固有的变通空间及其积极的变通行为对于化解我国特有的组织悖论的正向作用,找准问题的症结、找对发展的路径是乡村振兴的基础,不以各种指标来推行政策才能有效地防止基层政策执行者应对压力的对标式执行,结合本土环境才能更好地促进政策本土化。

关键词: 基层政策, 执行者, 政策执行, 行动逻辑, 精准扶贫

Abstract: Whether policies can be well implemented relies on the performance of primary-level policy executors. Such performance, however, in reality often presents a complex and contradictory pattern. This paper takes the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation policies in X Town (Sichuan) as a case, and finds that there has been a triple logic in implementing policies: 1) when dealing with the conflict between policy objectives, implementation pressure and insufficient resources, these executors give normative response that will produce a compliant logic of policy target effect; 2) when dealing with the internal contradiction of policy design and its conflict with the working environment and target groups, they take the initiative to adjust the behavior and promote the adaptive logic of policy localization; 3) when there are institutional loopholes in the policy implementation system and profit opportunities provided by the working environment, they strive for self-protection and self-interest, leading to distorted logic of policy alienation. Through an in-depth analysis of this individual case, we hope to make up for the shortcomings of the current policy implementation design and thusprovide inspiration for China’s rural revitalization: rural revitalization cannot be measured by various indicators alone, nor can it be promoted by administrative forces alone; the system and specific measures for rural revitalization should be designed according to local conditions. In terms of the corresponding policy design, we must be aware of the inherent flexibility of primary-level policy executors and their positive role in resolving the unique organizational paradox in China; the key is to find the crux of the problem, and find the right path for development; policies should be implemented in line with local conditions for localization, instead of relying on various indicators, an approach resulting in bench-marking in response to pressure.

Key words: policy executors at the primary level, policy implementation, action logic, policies of targeted poverty alleviation

中图分类号:

D630

皇娟, 唐银彬. 复杂情境与多重应对: 基层政策执行者的行动逻辑——基于四川省X镇精准扶贫政策执行的个案[J]. 广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）, 2022, 58(6): 55-68.

HUANG Juan, TANG Yin-bin. Complex Situations and Multiple Responses: Action Logic of Policy Executors at the Primary Level —Based on the Case of Implementation of Targeted Poverty Alleviation Policy in X Town, Sichuan Province[J]. Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2022, 58(6): 55-68.

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