基层治理中的基础性权力: 制度本质及其实现机制——基于城市管理执法的多案例研究

doi:10.16088/j.issn.1001-6597.2022.06.002

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 城市管理中的执法规范化体现着执法能力的制度化,是国家治理能力现代化的内在要求。迈克尔·曼将国家基础性权力视为国家的制度性能力,它表明国家能够获取社会支持并通过既定制度来实施政策和协调社会,因而无需依赖专断性暴力实现国家意志。我国城市基层执法中的国家与社会互动实践表明,执法组织通过构建权威、引导合作、促进合法化、凝聚共识等多种机制促进国家与公众合作,使执法者以一种赢得社会支持与自愿服从的方式完成执法任务,从而塑造着基层治理中的基础性权力。但上述机制也分别受到政策变动、维稳思维、制度资源不足和利益冲突等多方面约束而难以保持长效,这些约束对基层国家的制度化治理能力形成挑战,因而可能抑制基础性权力的增长。长远来看,一个自主的理性化行政体系和一个共识的合作性社会,分别在科层维度和社会维度上为基础性权力的生长提供必要推动力。

关键词: 基础性权力, 制度性能力, 基层执法, 规范执法

Abstract: The standardization of law enforcement in urban management reflects the institutionalization of law enforcement capacity and is the inherent requirement of the modernization of national governance capacity. Michael Mann defines the infrastructural power as the institutional capacity of the state that enables the state to obtain social support, and implement policies and coordinate social life through the established system, without relying on arbitrary violence to achieve its will. China’s practice of interaction between the state and society in urban primary-level law enforcement shows that law enforcement organizations promote cooperation between the state and the public by such mechanisms as building authority, guiding cooperation, promoting legalization, building consensus, so that law enforcers can accomplish their tasks in a way that wins social support and voluntary obedience, thus shaping the infrastructural power in primary-level governance. However, the mechanisms are also constrained by policy changes, stability maintenance thinking, insufficient institutional resources and conflicts of interest, thus making a maintenance of its long-term effectiveness a tough mission. These constraints pose challenges to the institutional governance capacity of one state, and thus may inhibit the growth of its infrastructural power. In the long run, an independent and rational administrative system and a cooperative society of consensus will provide the necessary impetus for the growth of infrastructural power in the bureaucratic and social dimensions respectively.

Key words: infrastructural power, institutional capacities of state, law enforcement at the primary-level, standardized law enforcement

中图分类号:

D63-31

邵春霞, 张照. 基层治理中的基础性权力: 制度本质及其实现机制——基于城市管理执法的多案例研究[J]. 广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）, 2022, 58(6): 14-25.

SHAO Chun-xia, ZHANG Zhao. Infrastructural Power in Primary-level Governance: Institutional Nature and Its Implementation Mechanisms —A Multi-case Study on Urban Management and Law Enforcement[J]. Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2022, 58(6): 14-25.

参考文献

[1] 秦川.地摊经济:升温不能“发烧”[EB/OL].(2020-06-06)[2020-07-15].《人民日报》客户端,http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0606/c1003-31737652.html.
[2] 王春业.论柔性执法[J].中共中央党校学报,2007(5):50-55.
[3] 郑伟.柔性执法的理念缺陷及其现实回归——以上海城管执法为例[J].上海党史与党建,2016(2):35-37.
[4] [美]西达·斯考切波.国家与社会革命:对法国、俄国和中国的比较分析[M].何俊志,王学东,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2007.
[5] [美]查尔斯·蒂利.强制、资本和欧洲国家(公元990—1992年)[M].魏洪钟,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2007.
[6] [英]安东尼·吉登斯.民族—国家与暴力[M].胡宗泽,赵力涛,译.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1998.
[7] [英]迈克尔·曼.社会权力的来源(第二卷·上)[M].陈海宏,等译.上海:上海人民出版社,2007.
[8] 田雄,郑家昊.被裹挟的国家:基层治理的行动逻辑与乡村自主——以黄江县“秸秆禁烧”事件为例[J].公共管理学报,2016(2):141-151,160.
[9] 韩志明.街头官僚的空间阐释——基于工作界面的比较分析[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010(4):583-591.
[10] 韩志明.街头官僚的时间政治——以基层执法人员的工作时间为例[J].甘肃行政学院学报,2017(2):4-16,124.
[11] 何艳玲.中国土地执法摇摆现象及其解释[J].法学研究,2013(6):61-72.
[12] Swanson K E,Kuhn R G,Wei X U. Environmental policy implementation in rural China:a case study of Yuhang,Zhejiang[J]. Environmental Management,2001,27(4):481-491.
[13] 刘杨.基层执法专业化的实践困境及其解释——兼论基层执法的多元属性[J].华中科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016(5):49-58.
[14] Tilt B.The political ecology of pollution enforcement in China:a case from Sichuan’s rural industrial sector[J]. The China Quarterly,2007(192):915-932.
[15] 吴元元.双重博弈结构中的激励效应与运动式执法——以法律经济学为解释视角[J].法商研究,2015(1):54-61.
[16] Gobel C.Uneven policy implementation in rural China[J].The China Journal,2011(65):53-76.
[17] Yan H,Van Rooij B,Van Der Heijden J. The enforcement-compliance paradox:implementation of pesticide regulation in China[J]. China Information,2016,30(2):209-231.
[18] Mann, Michael. The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results[J]. European Journal of Sociology, 1984,25(2):185-213.
[19] 殷冬水,赵德昊.基础性权力:现代国家的标识——国家基础性权力的政治理论透视与解释[J].学习与探索,2019(9):81-88,192.
[20] [瑞士]安德烈亚斯·威默.国家建构——聚合与崩溃[M].叶江,译.上海:格致出版社, 2019.
[21] [英]克里斯多夫·皮尔逊.论现代国家[M].刘国兵,译.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2017.
[22] Weingast B R . The economic role of political institutions:market-preserving federalism and economic development[J]. Journal of Law Economics & Organization,1995,11(1):1-31.
[23] Besley T J ,Persson T . The origins of state capacity:property rights,taxation,and politics[J]. American Economic Review,2007, 99(4):1218-1244.
[24] [美]曼瑟·奥尔森.权力与繁荣[M].苏长和,嵇飞,译.上海:上海世纪出集团,2014.
[25] Melville A,Mironyuk M.“Bad enough governance”:state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies[J]. Post-Soviet Affairs,2016,32(2):132-151.
[26] Dickson B J. Integrating wealth and power in China: The Communist Party’s embrace of the private sector[M].New York,NY:Cambridge University Press,2007.
[27] 孙仕奇. S市食品摊贩新形态:车厢小店[EB/OL].(2020-06-22)[2020-07-15].中工网,http://job.workercn.cn/311/202006/22/200622154007862.shtml.
[28] 刘杨.执法能力的损耗与重建——以基层食药监执法为经验样本[J].法学研究,2019(1):23-40.
[29] Evans P.Embedded autonomy:states and industrial transformation[M]. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press,1995.
[30] Zacka B. When the state meets the street:public service and moral agency[M]. Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,2017.
[31] Lipsky M.Street-Level bureaucracy:dilemmas of the individual in public services[M]. New York,NY:Russell Sage Foundation,1980.
[32] Back H,Hadenius A. Democracy and state capacity:exploring a J-shaped relationship[J]. Governance,2010,21(1):1-24.
[33] Weiss L. The myth of powerless state[M]. New York,NY:Cornell University Press,1998.
[34] [美]乔尔·S. 米格代尔.强社会与弱国家——第三世界的国家社会关系及国家能力[M].张长东,等译.南京:江苏人民出版社,2012.
[35] 黄冬娅.比较政治学视野下的国家分殊性、自主性和有效性[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009(4):488-494.

Metrics

Viewed

Full text

Abstract

Cited

Shared

Discussed